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CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
HOMICIDE: CAN THE CRIMINAL LAW
CONTROL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR?
by John E. Stoner
ON September 14, 1984, a New Jersey grand jury indicted the Six
Flags Corporation on charges of aggravated manslaughter stem-
ming from the deaths of eight youths killed in a fire while trapped in
one of the park's amusements.' The grand jury also indicted two of the
corporation's executives for manslaughter. 2  The indictment marked only
the second time that a state has indicted a corporation for any degree of
homicide greater than negligent homicide. In the first case an Indiana jury
acquitted the Ford Motor Company on three counts of reckless homicide
arising out of the deaths of three girls in a Ford Pinto automobile. 3 In addi-
tion to these two indictments, in recent years several states have begun to
allow the indictment of corporations for lesser degrees of homicide.4 As a
result of the increasing number of corporations indicted for homicide and
the increasing tendency to charge corporations with other intent offenses,
1. State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 65,084 (Ocean City, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., indict-
ment filed Sept. 14, 1984); see Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 8, col. 1 (Sw. ed.) (report of the
indictment); infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text (discussion of the case). The New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines aggravated manslaughter as occurring "when the actor
recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I 1-4(a) (West 1982). Aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first
degree. Id. § 2C: 11-4(c). It is a form of criminal homicide, which a person commits if he
"purposely, knowingly, [or] recklessly . . . causes the death of another human being." Id.
§ 2C: 11-2(a). "Person" includes a corporation or an unincorporated association when rele-
vant. Id. § 2C:1-14(g).
2. State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 65,084 (Ocean City, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., indict-
ment filed Sept 14, 1984). The New Jersey code states that criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter when it is committed recklessly. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-4(b) (West 1982).
Manslaughter is a second degree crime. Id. § 2C: 11-4(c).
3. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct., indictment filed Sept. 13, 1978),
digested at 47 U.S.L.W. 2178 (1978); see also 47 U.S.L.W. 2514-15 (1978) (text of judge's
denial of motion to quash). See generally Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homi-
cide: The Controversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 465, 483-84 (1981) (discussing the
Ford Motor Co. case); Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-mak-
ing, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911, 919-24 (1979) (analyzing the Ford Motor Co. case prior to
the trial).
4. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3
(1983) (manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980) (manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423
A.2d 413 (1980) (vehicular homicide); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted) (criminally negligent homicide).
1275
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the legal community is becoming embroiled in the battle over the efficacy of
corporate criminal liability. 5
This Comment first traces the development of corporate criminal liability
for homicide in American jurisprudence. The goals of criminal law are then
examined against the background of corporate criminal liability, and the effi-
cacy of their application to corporations is discussed. Finally, this Comment
raises questions about the ability of courts to mesh the corporate concept of
a fictional entity with traditional criminal law legal principles.
I. HISTORY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE
A. Early History
The most widely accepted common law view rejected the notion that a
corporation could be held criminally liable.6 As the corporate form became
more popular in America, however, some action had to be taken to control
corporate criminal activities. Early decisions held corporations criminally
liable for regulatory offerses or nonfeasance, 7 but not for misfeasance. 8 In
5. Several commentators have applauded the expansion of corporate criminal liability
and called for its increased use in appropriate circumstances. See Elkins, Corporations and the
Criminal Law. An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 128-29 (1976); Fisse, Reconstructing Cor-
porate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141,
1145 (1983); Note, supra note 3, at 924. Other commentators argue that corporate criminal
liability is unworkable and inefficient. See Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 582, 582 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Economic Inefficiency]; Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability For Homicide. Has The
Fiction Been Extended Too Far?, 4 J.L. & CoM. 95, 125-26 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Fiction Extended Too Far?]; Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Neces-
sary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 917-26 (1975).
The debate will likely be further exacerbated by the recent tragedy in Bhopal, India. A
storage tank containing methyl isocynate leaked, unleashing a deadly gas cloud that killed
approximately 2,500 people and injured an estimated 100,000 more. Within hours of the acci-
dent, Indian officials arrested the manager of the Union Carbide plant at which the leak oc-
curred and four of his colleagues on charges of "culpable homicide through negligence."
India's Night of Death, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 24. In addition, Indian officials arrested Union
Carbide's United States Chairman, Warren M. Anderson, and two more Union Carbide offi-
cials later in the week, charging them with "negligence and corporate criminal liability" and
"criminal conspiracy." The charges carry a maximum penalty of death under Indian law.
Officials later released Anderson, but the arrested Union Carbide of India officials remained in
custody. Id. In addition to the potential criminal liability, attorneys have filed civil suits ex-
ceeding $15 billion. Id. at 24-25; see also Union Carbide Fights for Its Life, BUSINESS WEEK,
Dec. 24, 1984, at 52-60 (account of the tragedy and legal difficulties).
6. As Lord Holt, C.J., stated: "A corporation is not indictable, but the particular mem-
bers of it are." Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (K.B. 1701). See generally Bernard, The
Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability); Brickey, Corporate Criminal Account-
ability' A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393 (1982) (tracing the develop-
ment of corporate criminal liability at the common law), 22 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4-5 (1984)
(noting the difference of opinion among commentators as to the development of criminal liabil-
ity); Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 393 (1982) (tracing the development of corporate criminal liability at the com-
mon law).
7. Nonfeasance is the nonperformance of some act that ought to be performed.
Desmarais v. Wachusett Regional School Dist., 360 Mass. 591, 276 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1971).
8. State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 43-44 (1841). Misfeasance is the
improper performance of some act that a person may lawfully do. Desmarais v. Wachusett
Regional School Dist., 360 Mass. 591, 276 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1971).
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1852 the New Jersey Supreme Court established a precedent by abandoning
the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction and affirming the propriety of hold-
ing a corporation criminally liable for an affirmative act. 9 Two years later in
Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge10 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court followed suit, characterizing the nonfeasance/misfeasance
distinction as absurd.II The court in Bedford Bridge noted that it could
classify the nature of the wrong either as failing to construct a proper bridge,
thus allowing a finding of nonfeasance, or as constructing an improper
bridge, allowing a finding of misfeasance.12 If the court maintained the non-
feasance/misfeasance distinction, then the court's choice of classification
would predetermine the outcome of the matter.
Despite these courts' attempts to expand corporate criminal liability, sub-
stantial barriers remained to prosecuting a corporation for crimes requiring
the formulation of intent. Courts considered corporations incapable of
forming the mens rea 13 necessary for a finding of guilt in those crimes char-
acterized as malus animus.'4 Jurists refused to attribute a specific state of
mind to the corporate "person" that had no soul and existed purely as an
economic entity. I5 In addition, since the corporation lacked any physical
existence that could be jailed, statutes requiring corporal punishment for
many serious crimes precluded prosecution.' 6 Some statutorily defined
crimes required commission by human beings, again effectively precluding
prosecution of corporations.' 7
Beginning in 1904 these barriers to prosecution of corporations began to
fall. In United States v. Van Schaik' s a federal court of appeals confronted
the issue of some statutes' absence of an appropriate means of punishment
for corporations. The court allowed indictment of the corporation in Van
Schaik after some 900 passengers drowned when a steamship owned by the
corporation caught fire. I9 The life preservers provided by the ship failed to
9. See State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852). The court noted that once
the concept of holding a corporation for nonfeasance is accepted, all objections as to the intan-
gibility of the corporation fall away. Id. at 366. Even if the corporation could act "not affirm-
atively" on its own behalf, it could "employ the hands of others." Id. at 367.
10. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854).
11. Id. at 346.
12. Id.
13. Mens rea is defined as a guilty mind or a guilty or wrongful purpose. Tift v. State, 133
Ga. App. 466, 211 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1974). The Model Penal Code delineates four states of
mens rea: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)
(Proposed official draft 1962).
14. Malus animus is bad or evil intention. See New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. at 345; State
v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 460, 460 (1852); Queen v. Great N. of England Ry., 115
Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (1846).
15. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 33 (1972) (citing H.
HENN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 186 (1961)).
16. See Brickey, supra note 6, at 410 n.99. The author notes that since the early felonies
were punishable by death or dismemberment, obstacles prevented imposing corporate liability
for felonies. Id.
17. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
18. 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
19. The case came before the court of appeals when the defendants filed demurrers seek-
ing to quash the indictment.
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keep those passengers who jumped overboard afloat. The court could find
the corporation guilty of manslaughter pursuant to a federal statute that pro-
vided that an owner shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter if through the
owner's fraud, connivance, misconduct, or violation of the law a person loses
his life.20 Another statute charged steamship owners with the duty of pro-
viding suitable life preservers for all passengers. 21 The court stated that the
fact that the manslaughter statute provided only for a punishment of impris-
onment failed to bar prosecution of the corporation. 22 Noting that the lack
of a suitable punishment for corporations must have been merely an over-
sight, the court stated that Congress surely could not have meant to allow
seafaring corporate carriers to escape liability for acts punishable if per-
formed by individuals. 23 The court thus imputed to Congress an intent to
punish corporations despite the statute's silence. 24
In 1909 the Supreme Court further eroded the punishment barrier in
United States v. Union Supply Co.25 In Union Supply a corporation allegedly
had violated a federal statute regarding record-keeping by oleomargarine
dealers. 26 The statute provided that in the event of a conviction, punishment
consisted of both a fine and imprisonment. 27 The Court held that when a
statute provides for two independent punitive sanctions, the Court would
construe the statute so as to give effect to any sanction that can practicably
be applied. 28 The Court's decision, therefore, made it possible to prosecute
the corporation and, if the corporation were found guilty, to impose on it
only the fine portion of the statutory punishment.
In this same year the Supreme Court also overcame the second barrier to
prosecution, the requirement in certain statutes that a crime be committed
by human beings. The Court upheld the constitutionality of holding a cor-
poration criminally liable for the acts and omissions of its agents in New
York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States.2 9 More specifically,
the Court imputed the agent's intent to the corporation, 30 thus exposing the
20. 134 F. at 594.
21. Id. at 597.
22. Id. at 602.
23. Id. The court inquired, "[ius it to be concluded, simply because the given punishment
cannot be enforced, that Congress intended to allow corporate carriers by sea to kill their
passengers through misconduct that would be a punishable offense if done by a natural per-
son?" Id.
24. The court noted that a more reasonable interpretation of the statute was that Congress
inadvertently omitted to include punishment for corporations, rather than that it intended to
cloak the owners with immunity simply because they were corporations. Id.
25. 215 U.S. 50 (1909).
26. See Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 57-110, 32 Stat. 193, 197.
27. Id. § 6, 32 Stat. at 197.
28. 215 U.S. at 55. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes noted:
[I]f we free our minds from the notion that criminal statutes must be construed
by some artificial and conventional rule, the natural inference, when a statute
prescribes two independent penalties, is that it means to inflict them so far as it
can, and that if one of them is impossible, it does not mean on that account to let
the defendant escape.
Id.
29. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
30. Id. at 494. New York Central was charged and convicted of granting rebates to sugar
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corporation to criminal liability for those crimes requiring the formulation of
intent. 31 The Court stated that a corporation that profits by the acts of its
agents and officers should be punishable because of the intent and knowledge
of those agents to whom it has granted authority to act. 32 The Court indi-
cated that imputing the agents' knowledge to the corporation comported
with public policy and allowed for some measure of control over corpora-
tions, which had begun to dominate the business world even in the early
1900S. 33
An analysis of early attempts to prosecute corporations for homicide best
demonstrates the statutory barriers to prosecution that existed. In People v.
Rochester Railway & Light Co. 34 a grand jury indicted a utility company for
criminal homicide for allegedly installing a gas jet negligently and thus caus-
ing the death of an apartment tenant by asphyxiation.35 The New York
Court of Appeals first confronted the problem of intent. 36 Drawing on the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Central and the vicarious liability
concept from tort law, 37 the court held that corporations could commit cer-
tain acts of criminal homicide. 38 The court next turned to an analysis of the
homicide statute, which defined homicide as "the killing of one human being
by the act, procurement or omission of another."' 39 The court concluded
that the use of the word "another" in the statute limited liability for commis-
sion of the offense to human beings. 4° The court expressly rejected the con-
tention that the legislature could have meant "another" to refer to a
"person," thus possibly encompassing a corporation. 4'
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 42
refineries in violation of the Elkins Act. See Elkins Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1982)). The Court analogized to civil liability, stating that it
was going only one step beyond the principle governing civil liability by holding that the act of
the agent could be controlled by imputing his act to his employer and then penalizing the
corporation. 212 U.S. at 494.
31. 212 U.S. at 494-95.
32. Id. at 495.
33. Id. Despite its holding, the Court noted that corporations could not commit some
crimes because of the very nature of the crimes. Id. at 494. The Court failed, however, to
elaborate on which crimes it considered corporations incapable of committing.
34. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
35. 88 N.E. at 22.
36. Id. at 22-24.
37. The concept of vicarious liability is the imputation of the negligent acts of A to B,
despite B's having played no part in the commission of the act, having done nothing to en-
courage it, and perhaps even having done all that was possible to prevent it, The imputation
arises out of some relationship between A and B. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971); see also Fisse, supra note 5, at 1192-94 (discussing the vicarious
liability concept as applied to corporate criminal law).
38. 88 N.E. at 24. The court noted: "[W]e have no doubt that a definition of certain
forms of manslaughter might have been formulated which would be applicable to a corpora-
tion, and make it criminally liable for various acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance when result-
ing in homicide . I..." d
39. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 179, as quoted in 88 N.E. at 24.
40. 88 N.E. at 24. To hold otherwise, the court noted, would "violent[ly] strain" interpre-
tation of criminal statutes. Id.
41. Id.
42. 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
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overcame the semantic difficulties that had plagued the New York court in
Rochester Railway. In Lehigh Valley a grand jury indicted a railroad corpo-
ration and others for criminal manslaughter after some railroad cars over-
loaded with dynamite exploded and killed a bystander. 43 The Lehigh Valley
court rejected the widely accepted common law definition of manslaugh-
ter,44 noting that many authorities disagreed as to the proper definition. 45
Refusing to be constrained by such a narrow definition of homicide, the
court adopted a more flexible definition of homicide, which it felt comported
with the growing trend to hold corporations criminally liable.46 Indicating
that the Rochester Railway decision exemplified the way in which inflexible
construction of statutes stifles the growth and development of the law,47 the
Lehigh Valley court became the first to uphold the indictment of a corpora-
tion for criminal homicide. 48 The railroad pleaded nole contendere to the
charge and paid a $1,000 fine.49
B. Modern Decisions
New Jersey remained the only state to allow corporations to be indicted
for criminal homicide until 1974, when New York permitted the indictment
of a corporation for criminal homicide. In People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.50 a
grand jury indicted a corporation for criminally negligent homicide after a
cofferdam 5 l under construction collapsed during assembly, leading to the
drowning of two workmen. The New York Court of Appeals had stated in
Rochester Railway that a grand jury could theoretically indict a corporation
for homicide, but that the statute as written in 1909 precluded indictment. 52
The Ebasco Services court, however, dealt with a revised statute. 53 The new
43. 103 A. at 686.
44. The common law definition of manslaughter is the killing of one human being by
another. Id.
45. The court noted that Blackstone defined felonious homicide as "the killing of a human
creature, of any age or sex, without justification or excuse." Id. at 686 (citing 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *188).
46. 103 A. at 686. The court expressly rejected the notion that the definition of "person"
should be limited to human beings and noted that the statutory definition included "bodies
corporate." Id.
47. Id. The Lehigh Valley court clearly indicated that charging the corporation with neg-
ligent homicide did not necessarily entail attributing criminal intention to the corporation. See
Bernard, supra note 6, at 11; see also P. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 184 (1979)
(asserting that intention to commit murder will likely never be attributed to corporations); J.
SIGLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 251 (1981) (asserting that corporations cannot
commit premeditated murder, rape, or assault). As the Ford Motor Co. and Six Flags cases
show, however, the criminal law is creeping ever nearer to attributing such intent.
48. Although the Van Schaik court allowed an indictment to stand, the indictment was
based on the violation of a statute that defined a violation resulting in death as per se man-
slaughter. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Van Schaik
case.
49. State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 92 N.J.L. 261, 106 A. 23, 23 (1919) (second appeal).
50. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
51. A cofferdam is a temporary boxlike structure that is placed in a river to allow work-
men to descend to the river bottom for construction purposes. See Comment, supra note 3, at
480 n. 154.
52. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
53. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00-.60 (McKinney 1975).
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statute stated that "[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide
when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person."'54
The court noted that the homicide article of the penal code defined "person"
as a human being born and alive only when referring to the victim of homi-
cide."5 The statute, therefore, did not require that a human being commit the
offense. 56 Turning to the general definition of "person" found in the code,
the court held that as to the perpetrators of the offense, "person" could refer
to a public or private corporation as well as to a human being.57 The court
stated that it did not commit any manifest impropriety by allowing the in-
dictment of a corporation for manslaugter.18 The court, however, found the
indictment defective and dismissed the case. 59
Indiana became the third state to allow the indictment of corporations for
criminal homicide in State v. Ford Motor Co.60 The case established prece-
dents in two areas of the law, making it especially noteworthy. Ford Motor
Co. marked the first time that a grand jury indicted a corporation for a crim-
inal offense in a product liability matter. 61 The case also involved the first
instance in which a state charged an American corporation with reckless
homicide rather than the lesser offense of negligent homicide. 62 Indiana in-
dicted Ford on three counts of reckless homicide following the burning
deaths of three teenage girls after another vehicle struck their Ford Pinto
automobile from behind. The state alleged that Ford had knowingly manu-
factured a defective gas tank and had failed to correct the danger or to warn
car owners. 63 Ford contended that a corporation could not be indicted for
reckless homicide under the Indiana Criminal Code.64 The definition of
"person" contained in the criminal title, however, included corporations. 65
Another section of the criminal title further supported the indictment by
54. Id. § 125.10, quoted at 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
55. 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05[1] (McKinney 1975).
56. 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 811.
59. Id. at 812. Even though this case was dismissed, the court's decision clearly indicates
that a corporation is indictable on a charge of criminal homicide in New York.
60. No. 5324 (Ind. Sup. Ct., indictment filed Sept. 13, 1978), digested at 47 U.S.L.W. 2178
(1978); see also M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 259-62 (1980) (discussing
Ford Motor Co. and Pinto liability generally); Comment, supra note 3, at 483-84 (analyzing
Ford Motor Co.).
61. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 261. The authors note that
although the maximum penalty that the court could impose was relatively small ($30,000),
Ford spent an estimated $1 million to defend the case, fearing that a conviction would lead to
greater liability in subsequent civil suits. Id.
62. See Bernard, supra note 6, at 12; Comment, supra note 3, at 465; Note, supra note 3,
at 911.
63. See 47 U.S.L.W. 2514, 2515 (1978). In the text of his denial of the motion to dismiss,
the judge stated: "[I]t is alleged that the defendant did recklessly authorize and approve the
design, and did recklessly design and manufacture the automobile, and the indictment then
charges that the defendant permitted said automobile to remain upon the highways and by-
ways of the county." Id.
64. Id. Ford also alleged the constitutional defenses of lack of fair notice, ex post facto,
and federal preemption.
65. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (Bums 1979) defines "person" to include "a human
being, corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or government entity."
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stating that corporations are subject to prosecution for any offense.66 The
title also provided for the levying of fines, costs, or forfeiture to punish a
corporation convicted of any offense.67 The statutory problems that had
faced other courts did not, therefore, present any problem for the Ford Mo-
tor Co. court.
The highly publicized trial of the Ford Motor Co. case lasted ten weeks68
and ended with a jury acquittal on all three counts. 69 The importance of the
trial, however, has not gone unnoticed. Even before the case actually went
to trial, legal commentary addressed its implications. 70 After the trial some
observers argued that, despite the acquittal, the case put corporate America
on notice that courts will hold them criminally liable for their actions. 71
Other writers, however, noted that a large corporation is able to wield con-
siderable power in denying accusations against it, as Ford did in the Pinto
case. 72 While observers, therefore, may disagree on the type of impact the
case had, they do appear to agree that because of its precedential value the
case did have a tremendous impact on American corporate criminal
jurisprudence. 73
Since the Ford Motor Co. trial four states have dealt with questions of
corporate criminal liability for homicide. Kentucky allowed the indictment
of a corporation for second degree manslaughter in Commonwealth v. Fort-
ner LP Gas Co. 74 The court relied upon a statutory definition of "person"
that included corporations 75 as well as provisions dealing with corporate
66. Id. § 35-41-2-3(a).
67. Id. § 35-41-2-3(b).
68. M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 261; Comment, supra note 3, at 484;
Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
69. M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 261. Professors Clinard and Yeager
note that during the trial the court disallowed numerous Ford documents that showed that
Ford knew of the defect because the documents pertained to model years other than 1973, the
year model in which the girls burned to death. Id. Ford had pursued an internal cost/benefit
analysis and concluded that the $11 safety improvement that would make the Pinto less likely
to burn would cost more than the benefit derived. Id. at 260. As of 1977, one commentator
estimated that 500 burn deaths had occurred because of Pinto gas tank ruptures. In many of
these accidents no other serious injury occurred. See generally Dowie, How Ford Put Two
Million Firetraps on Wheels, 23 Bus. & Soc. REV. 46 (1977) (analyzing the circumstances
surrounding Ford's decision to delay recalling the Pinto).
70. See Note, supra note 3.
71. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 261; Comment, supra note 3, at 484.
72. See M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE DEVIANCE 17-18 (1982).
73. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 261-62; Comment, supra note 3, at
484; Note supra note 3, at 911.
74. 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). The Kentucky Court of Appeals had dealt with
the question once before in Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459
(1913). In that case the court held that corporations might be liable for lesser degrees of
homicide if the legislature plainly expressed such an intent and provided appropriate punish-
ment. 153 S.W. at 463. The court, however, could not find such an intent in the applicable
statute as then written, stating that to hold that "person" included corporations would be
giving the word a tortured meaning. Id. at 461-62. The court in Fortner was dealing with an
updated statute.
75. Ky. REV. STAT. § 500.080(12) (1975) states: "'Person' means human being, and
where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partner-
ship, a government or a government authority."
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fines and liability76 in upholding the indictment of Fortner.
Pennsylvania and California also have recently allowed the prosecution of
corporations for criminal homicide. In Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School
Bus Lines77 a Pennsylvania superior court reversed the lower court's quash-
ing of an information 78 charging a corporation with criminal liability in the
death of a child run over by the corporation's school bus.79 The company
had failed to equip the bus with properly adjusted mirrors that would have
enabled the driver to see the child after she had left the bus.8 0 The defendant
asserted all of the classic defenses to prosecution of a corporation." Over-
ruling a 1900 precedent, the court allowed the indictment to stand.82
A California court of appeals also upheld the indictment of a corporation
for criminal homicide in Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court.8 3 The
case arose after seven construction workers were killed in an accident at a
power plant construction site. After examining decisions from California
and other jurisdictions, the court followed its interpretation of the applicable
statute's plain meaning and allowed the indictment for manslaughter.8 4 The
court rejected a due process argument raised by the corporation.85
Texas is the only state that has rejected the concept of corporate criminal
liability for homicide in recent years. In Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State 6 a
Texas court of appeals dismissed an information charging a corporation with
76. The legislature had included a section providing for fines as penalties against corpora-
tions. Id. § 534.050. The maximum fine for a felony is $20,000 or double the amount of the
defendant's gain from the offense, whichever is greater. Id. The legislature also had written a
section detailing corporate liability. Id. § 502.050.
77. 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A.2d 413 (1980).
78. An information is an accusation exhibited against some person without the benefit of
an indictment by a grand jury. Salvail v. Sharkey, 108 R.I. 63, 271 A.2d 814, 817 (1970).
79. The charge was homicide by vehicle, which occurs when a person "unintentionally
causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law . . . applying to
the operation or use of a vehicle . . . when the violation is the cause of death." 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977). A new version of the statute is the same for the relevant
offense. See id. § 3732 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
80. The state requires such mirrors pursuant to a statute. See id. § 4552(e) (Purdon
1977).
81. The corporation asserted that by definition only a natural person could commit the
offense. 423 A.2d at 413. The lower court agreed, noting that the legislature had written the
statute using the term "any person who... causes the death of another." Id. The lower court
stated that "who" refers to humans and "which" refers to corporations, but the appellate court
expressly rejected this reasoning. Id. at 420. The lower court also asserted that no suitable
punishment could be imposed. The appellate court also rejected this reasoning, citing Van
Schaik and other decisions. Id. at 421-23.
82. Id. at 418-19. The court overruled Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger
Ry., 24 Pa. C. 25 (1900), in which the court refused to hold a corporation liable for assault in
the ejection of a passenger. See Comment, supra note 3, at 468-70.
83. 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983).
84. 197 Cal. Rptr. at 6-9. The court noted that when "a statute's language is clear, its
plain meaning should be followed." Id. at 6. The California Penal Code defines "person" so
as to include corporations. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970). Manslaughter is defined as
the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. Id. § 192. California also has a catch-
all statute that provides for punishment of corporations. Id. § 672. In light of these statutes,
the court held that the plain meaning rule allows the indictment of corporations for man-
slaughter. 197 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
85. 197 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
86. 649 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted). The case arose
1985] 1283
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
criminally negligent homicide. The court stated that the Texas legislature
could not have intended to include corporations within the class of "per-
sons" capable of forming the requisite intent to commit homicide.87 The
statute, however, described homicide as the killing of an "individual" by a
"person."'8 8 The court noted that although "person" is defined to include
corporations, 9 giving the statute its plain meaning would allow the state to
prosecute corporations for every crime that a person could commit,90 includ-
ing degrees of homicide requiring the culpable mental state of intentionally
or knowingly.9 1 Noting the infeasibility of attributing such a mental state to
a corporation, the court refused to change the indictable parties based upon
the state of culpability. 92 The court warned that unless the legislature
clearly evinces a desire to so prosecute corporations, courts should "make
haste slowly" in holding corporations criminally liable for homicide. 93
The court of appeals opinion ignored changes that the legislature made
when it revised the Texas Penal Code in 1974.94 As noted in the practice
commentary to section 19.01 of the penal code, throughout the code the
term "another" is used to refer to the victim of the offense.9 5 In the homi-
cide chapter, however, "individual" is substituted for "another. '96 "Individ-
ual" is defined as a human being who is born and alive.97 If the legislature
had intended only human beings to be capable of committing homicide, it
could have defined homicide as the killing of one individual by another or as
the killing of an individual by an individual. The legislature did not choose
to do this, however, opting instead to define homicide as the killing of an
individual (human being) by a person (legal or natural).98 The legislature
exhibited an abundance of caution in its definition. The use of an alternative
definition, that is, the killing of one human or person by another, had caused
because of the deaths of two persons in a traffic accident allegedly caused by two of the corpo-
ration's employees.
87. Id. at 678-79.
88. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (Vernon 1974). The section states that "[a] person
commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negli-
gence causes the death of an individual." Id. Another section defines criminally negligent
homicide as causing the death of an individual by criminal negligence. Id. § 19.07(a).
89. See id. § 1.07(a)(27).
90. 649 S.W.2d at 678.
91. Id. at 679.
92. Id. at 678-79. The court noted that the statute's wording does not indicate that the
degree of culpability determines the type of individual capable of committing homicide. Id.
93. Id. at 679.
94. Texas was the last state to delineate a corporation's criminal responsibility. See An-
derson, Corporate Criminal Liability for Specific Intent Crimes and Offenses of Criminal Negli-
gence-The Direction of Texas Law, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 231, 232 (1984). The author noted
that a 1968 law review article might have spurred the legislature into action. Id. at 232-33; see
Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEX. L. REV. 60 .(1968). Professor Ham-
ilton authored a proposed revision of the Texas Penal Code that he published in the article.
See id. at 77-85. The legislature adopted several of Professor Hamilton's proposals. Anderson,
supra, at 233 n.9.
95. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 comment (Vernon 1974).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 1.07.
98. See supra note 88.
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some semantic problems in other jurisdictions.99 Texas lawmakers therefore
avoided an alternative definition. The legislators may have also been aware
that defining homicide as the killing of one person by another might allow
the state to charge one corporation with the "death" of another corporation.
The court of appeals did not consider any of these possibilities, asking in-
stead for a statute that plainly states that a corporation may be charged with
homicide. 100 The Vaughan case is currently pending before the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals on the state's appeal.
C. New Developments: Six Flags Indicted
On September 14, 1984, a New Jersey grand jury indicted the Six Flags
Corporation and two of its officers in connection with the deaths of eight
youths killed in a fire at one of the corporation's amusement parks in New
Jersey. 10' The fire occurred in the Haunted Castle amusement at Great Ad-
venture Park. The Six Flags Corporation and Great Adventure, Incorpo-
rated face charges of aggravated manslaughter, the most severe charge that
the state may bring against a corporation under New Jersey law. 102 The
grand jury also charged the individual defendants with manslaughter.10 3
The indictment alleges that Six Flags recklessly caused the deaths of the
eight youths and showed extreme indifference to human life. 1°4 The grand
jury found that the attraction had been unsafe since it opened in 1978.105
The fire began when an unidentified youth accidently touched his cigarette
lighter to a foam rubber padded wall inside the Haunted Castle. The grand
jury believed that the use of the highly flammable foam rubber padding indi-
cated the corporation's reckless disregard for human life, thus warranting
the aggravated manslaughter charge. 106 In addition to the criminal indict-
ment, Six Flags faces a number of civil lawsuits arising out of the incident. 107
If the Six Flags case goes to trial, it will mark only the second time that a
state has prosecuted a corporation for any degree of homicide requiring a
mens rea higher than negligence. No jury has ever convicted a corporation
of any offense greater than negligent homicide.10 8 If the Six Flags jury re-
turns a guilty verdict, the case will have a tremendous impact on American
corporate criminal jurisprudence. Even if the jury convicts Six Flags, how-
ever, a question still remains as to the efficacy of corporate criminal liability.
99. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
100. 649 S.W.2d at 679.
101. State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 65,084 (Ocean City, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., indict-
ment filed Sept. 14, 1984); see Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 8, col. 1 (Sw. ed.) (report of the
indictment).
102. Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1984, at 8, col. I (Sw. ed.).






108. The only other corporation against which a state has brought such charges, Ford
Motor Co., received an acquittal from the jury. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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II. THE EFFICACY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The cases dealing with corporate criminal liability for homicide provide
an excellent background against which to analyze the efficacy of corporate
criminal liability generally. Some observers believe that holding corpora-
tions criminally liable serves to deter corporations from engaging in criminal
activities. 109 Others disagree, however, and assert that attempting to punish
a fictional entity as a criminal will not serve to deter criminal behavior in any
way."10 The problem with corporate criminal liability, however viewed,
arises out of the collision of two legal concepts that are by their very nature
ill at ease with each other. The concept of a fictional economic entity simply
does not mesh with the four goals of criminal law: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.II An analysis of these four goals as they
apply to corporate criminal liability is necessary to any assessment of the
efficacy of that liability.
A. Deterrence
Observers historically have disagreed as to which of the enumerated goals
of criminal law the state seeks in holding corporations criminally liable. 1' 2
Observers almost unanimously agree, however, that the state seeks deter-
rence in every case." '3 In fact, some believe that deterrence is the only goal
of criminal law applicable to corporations. 1 4 While observers agree that
deterrence is a goal of corporate criminal liability, some question still re-
mains whether that goal is achieved. ' The courts that have convicted cor-
109. See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 5, at 129 (supporting corporate criminal liability for the
social good); Fisse, supra note 5, at 1243-46 (calling for revisions to make criminal liability for
corporations more effective); Note, supra note 3, at 923-24 (absent potential criminal responsi-
bility the value of human life is reduced to a mere cost/benefit analysis).
110. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 3, at 491-92 (questioning the extension of criminal law
to a fictional body); Comment, Economic Inefficiency, supra note 5, at 582 (asserting that pri-
vate remedies are superior to criminal remedies because of inefficiency of criminal remedies);
Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 125-26 (supporting civil remedies as a
substitute for criminal remedies).
111. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 15, § 5. The authors list education as a
separate goal. This Comment, however, will subsume education under the deterrence heading.
112. Compare Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1365-75 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Developments in the Law] (noting that the basic goal of corporate criminal liability is deter-
rence and thus the civil system is better equipped to handle corporations through fines), with
Fisse, supra note 5, at 1147, 1244 (arguing that the goals are deterrence and retribution, with
rehabilitation and incapacitation as subgoals; the criminal law is better suited to meet these
goals).
113. See Developments in the Law, supra note 112, at 1235-36 nn.16-20, 23-25.
114. Id. The author notes that:
In justifying the imposition of criminal sanctions for illicit corporate activity,
commentators most often cite deterrence as the primary rationale. They reason
that retribution cannot be a concern of statutes dealing with activities which are
not in and of themselves morally wrong . . . . Similarly, it is argued, society is
not concerned with incapacitating or rehabilitating those who might well be pil-
lars of the community had they not violated a technical economic regulation.
Id. at 1235 (footnotes omitted).
115. See Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 918
(asserting that since most corporate offenders are recidivists, clearly the punishments meted
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porations often have been lenient in meting out punishment.1 16 While a fine
may deter a small corporation, it will not likely deter a large corporation." 17
Fines large enough to affect large corporations, however, could run into
strong constitutional and judicial disfavor. A fine that is large enough to
deter a large corporation would likely face a challenge as an unconstitution-
ally excessive fine."18 Such fines can also have an adverse impact on corpo-
rate motivation and the free enterprise system. 119 Statutes often limit fines
to nominal amounts for many crimes. 120 In Mcllwain Bus Lines,121 for ex-
ample, the court levied a fine of only $10,000, the maximum amount that a
corporation could be fined for negligent homicide.' 22 The proper method of
calculating profit fines also presents courts with a problem. A Texas statute
provides that the courts may fine a corporation up to double the amount of
out serve neither to deter nor to rehabilitate); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 112,
at 1365-75 (evaluating deterrence and suggesting alternative solutions).
116. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 316 & apps. F-I. An analysis of the
data in the authors' appendix H shows that courts use monetary penalties and nonmonetary
criminal penalties sparingly as compared to other sanctions.
117. See id. at 316. Often statutory limitations keep fines low. As the authors note, the
fines "are ludicrously small relative to the corporations' assets, sales, and profits." Id. These
low penalties allow corporations to include penalties in their cost/benefit analyses. "Corporate
profit, not morality, is the ultimate test of effectiveness. Bankruptcy represents the ultimate
failure." Id. at 273.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted." A fine large enough
to deter a supercorporation such as General Motors could entail a penalty of billions of dollars.
The courts might question the propriety of such fines in light of the eighth amendment. See
also Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion?, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 639 (1984) (noting that excessive fines might face a challenge as cruel
and unusual punishment).
119. These impacts can be examined in light of what Professor John Coffee has called the
"deterrence trap" and what Professor Fisse calls the "retribution trap." See Coffee, "No Soul
to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 389-93 (1981); Fisse, supra note 5, at 1218. The concept of the
deterrence trap arises out of the theory that one committing a crime will only be deterred if the
expected punishment cost of the action exceeds the gain. See Coffee, supra, at 389. The ex-
pected penalty is calculated by discounting the expected profit by the risk of apprehension and
conviction factor. If the expected profit is $1 million and the risk of apprehension is 25%, then
the expected penalty must equal or exceed $4 million in order to deter the corporation. Id.
The dilemma arises when the corporation's resources are not adequate to satisfy such a pen-
alty. If the expected punishment cost exceeds the corporation's "wealth boundary," adequate
deterrence will not be achieved since the expected penalty will not equal or exceed the expected
gain. Id. at 390. The expected gain is the expected profit divided by the risk of loss, leading to
a $4 million expected gain figure in the above example. By inference, then, if courts impose
fines large enough to deter certain corporate actions, bankruptcy and its attendant impacts
may ensue. Note, however, that Professor Coffee bases the deterrence trap concept on purely
economic models. If the corporation involved is risk-averse, then it will likely choose to pur-
sue a legal course of action that avoids the possibility of bankruptcy, despite the fact that the
expected gain is greater than the expected penalty.
Professor Fisse notes that the same problem occurs with retribution. Fisse, supra note 5, at
1218. The retributive fine or sanction levied based on the concept of "justice as fairness" may
exceed the corporation's ability to pay, thus bankrupting the corporation. Id.
120. See supra note 117; see also Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at
118-19 (questioning the deterrent capability of nominal fines).
121. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
122. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101 (Purdon 1983). The statute limits the fine for a
misdemeanor of the first degree to $10,000.
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profit that the corporation earned through its illegal conduct. 123 In the case
of a national corporation, however, a determination of the amount of the
corporation's profit that was made within the state may be very difficult.
Texas has not yet invoked this statute in a criminal prosecution.
If fines cannot serve as an effective deterrent against corporate criminal
activity, then courts must search for nonmonetary means of punishing cor-
porations. Courts could impose probation upon the corporation, requiring
certain internal restructuring and the donation of time to community
projects.124 Again, however, problems arise. If a court mandates the inter-
nal restructuring of a corporation, some means for assuring that the corpora-
tion follows the court's orders is necessary. The court in effect would have
to become a corporate watchdog, constantly monitoring those corporations
acting under court orders. Overburdened courts cannot place themselves in
such an untenable position.
Some courts have required the donation of time to community projects as
an alternative punishment. 125 The use of such measures, however, raises
some new questions. 12 6 Problems can arise as to: (1) judicial favoritism to-
ward certain groups or projects; 127 (2) establishment clause violations if the
group being aided has any religious affiliation; 128 and (3) enforcement of any
requirements other than man-hour or dollar requirements.129 Opponents of
corporate criminal liability raise questions about whether such community
involvement projects are really punishment. 130 Unless the court requires a
corporation to donate a large amount of time or money, the corporation may
view such projects as simply the cost of doing business. 131
123. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Courts may apply the
profit fine in those cases arising out of personal injury, property damage, or other losses caused
by the corporation. Id.
124. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 305-10. See generally Note, supra
note 118, at 641-44 (analyzing the use of forced organizational reform as a corporate sanction).
125. See United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992
(1979) (upholding lower court's order that the defendant, who had misapplied bank funds,
perform two years of charitable work); United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp.
1159, 1164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bakeries required to deliver baked goods to community orga-
nizations as part of probation).
126. See Note, supra note 118, at 648-52 (discussing nonmonetary probation). The author
concludes that "[c]ourts should not be eager to wield their discretionary powers in such an
uncharted area." Id. at 662.
127. Id. at 655-56.
128. Id. at 651-52. The establishment clause forbids government support of religious
groups. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
129. The court can sentence a corporation to serve a certain number of hours aiding a
charitable group as a probation term, but the court cannot control the quality of work or effort
put into those hours. A condition requiring that a corporation furnish an executive to perform
the public service is mostly externalized, and the effect, therefore, does not reach the corpora-
tion. See Note, supra note 118, at 654.
130. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 292-94 (examining some community
service sentences and concluding that they lack any real deterrent impact).
131. Note, supra note 118, at 639. When probation conditions require the expenditure of
money or hours, the same can be said of probation. Some commentators, however, have criti-
cized the view of the corporation as purely a profit maximizer. See Coffee, Corporate Crime
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 419, 460 (1980).
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Some observers argue that the only way really to deter illegal corporate
behavior is to hold individuals responsible rather than the corporation. 132
Problems arise, however, from such an assertion. Courts often encounter
extreme difficulty in attempting to identify with precision the person within
the corporation responsible for any given action.133 In many of today's large
corporations this difficulty could be especially acute because of multiple of-
fices and levels of management that make tracing any act to one individual
impossible.
Aside from the identification problem, imposing liability on corporate offi-
cials is not efficacious for several other reasons. The courts often turn a
sympathetic ear to corporate officers convicted of illegal behavior.134 Both
judges and jurors tend to view a businessman as a respectable citizen not
deserving of condemnation. 135 In those cases in which the state charges
both the individual and the corporation, juries tend to convict the corpora-
tion and acquit the individual. 136 Jurors often sympathize with an officer
who acted for the good of the corporation and view the officer as a victim of
the profit-making pressures inherent in the corporate world. 137 The officer
also does not always suffer a damaged reputation in the eyes of his peers
from a criminal conviction. One observer noted that a difference exists be-
tween the business code and the criminal code, and a businessman loses pres-
tige only by violating both.' 38
When attempting to hold a corporate officer liable for the acts of those
subject to the officer's control, courts require a showing that the employee
acted within the scope of his employment and on behalf of the corpora-
tion. 139 Even if the prosecution satisfies these two elements, the officer, and
the corporation for that matter, can still assert two defenses. The officer
may assert that he exercised due diligence in overseeing the employee's activ-
132. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 112, at 1375 (concluding that criminal
sanctions effectively apply to individuals only); Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra
note 5, at 122-26 (concluding that individual criminal liability is more effective deterrent);
Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 927 (concluding
that threat of jail sentence for individuals will better serve to deter corporate illegality).
133. See Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 116; Comment, Is Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 922.
134. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 286-88. The professors note that
what executives fear the most is not conviction, but imprisonment. Judges, however, shrink
from the notion of sending a white collar criminal to jail. Id. at 288.
135. Id. at 288-92; see also Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?,
supra note 5, at 919 (public regards businessman as a respectable citizen).
136. See Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 120-21. The author notes
that in United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), the jury con-
victed the corporation, but acquitted the individual defendants. The court stated, "[W]e can-
not understand how the jury could have acquitted all of the individual defendants. As a
matter of logic, reconciliation between the verdict of guilt and verdict of acquittal is impossi-
ble." Id. at 411, quoted in Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 120. The
acquittal of the individual does not absolve the corporation and vice versa. Comment, Is
Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 911.
137. See Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 121.
138. See Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 918.
139. Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 108-09.
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ities. 140 Unless the crime is regulatory or strict-liability, this defense is ex-
culpatory if proven. 14 1  The officer may also assert the defense of ultra
vires. 142 Under this defense if the corporate officers have not participated in
or in any way encouraged illegal conduct, then the employee has automati-
cally acted outside the scope of employment.1 43 The defendant can argue
that since the corporation's charter controls its activities, any activities car-
ried on outside of the charter are ultra vires. 144 Courts once widely accepted
this theory, but it has fallen into disrepute today in most jurisdictions that
have addressed the question. 145
One other theory of punishment that addresses the individual and the cor-
poration is that of occupational disqualification. Under this theory the court
bars the individual committing an illegal act from participating in the activ-
ity that led to the illegal action. At least two recent observers have advo-
cated the use of occupational disqualification as a means of deterring
corporate behavior. 146 They argue that disqualification as a punishment
bears a reasonable relationship to the criminal act because it bars the indi-
vidual from pursuing the occupation of his choice. 147 The loss of wages in-
herent in such a punishment would also serve as the equivalent of a fine.' 48
Judges unwilling to incarcerate white collar criminals may be willing to use
occupational disqualification as an alternative. 149
The arguments made by these observers, however, assume too much. Oc-
cupational disqualification could fall prey to the problems inherent in any
attempt to deter corporate criminal behavior. First, in order to disqualify
the guilty individual, the prosecution and court must identify the person
who committed the act. As noted previously, this identification is virtually
impossible in most large corporations. The brunt of disqualification would,
therefore, very likely fall on small corporations. This fact mitigates against
one observer's claim that disqualification might lead to more even-handed
sentencing of corporate offenders. '50
The belief that judges would favor disqualification over incarceration is
also ill-founded. One of the main reasons that courts do not punish individ-
140. Id. at 109.
141. See id. See generally Comment, Limits on Individual Accountability for Corporate
Crimes, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 604, 610-18 (1984) (discussing strict liability offenses).
142. Comment, Fiction Extended Too Far?, supra note 5, at 111-12.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 378 (8th Cir. 1943) (malfeasance of corpo-
rate agents is not ultra vires); United States v. Mirror Lake Golf & Country Club, Inc., 232 F,
Supp. 167, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1964) ("It is horn-book law that a corporation may be held to be
criminally liable even though its acts are ultra vires.").
146. See Comment, Occupational Disqualification of Corporate Executives: An Innovative
Condition of Probation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Occupational Disqualification]; Comment, supra note 141, at 626-30.
147. See Comment, Occupational Disqualification, supra note 146, at 604-05; Comment,
supra note 141, at 627.
148. Comment, Occupational Disqualification, supra note 146, at 615; Comment, supra
note 141, at 627.
149. See Comment, supra note 141, at 627.
150. See id. at 629.
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uals is that the individuals are not considered worthy of condemnation.15 In
order to apply disqualification, the court must convict the individual in-
volved. Juries, however, often sympathize with individuals charged with
corporate illegality.1 52 Those cases that have produced criminal convictions
for individuals have rarely involved sentences of more than thirty days or
fines that amount to anything of consequence.1 53 If the courts intend occu-
pational disqualification to have any deterrent effect at all, they must impose
disqualifications with impacts reaching farther and punishing more severely
than the sentences and fines that the judicial system is already hesitant to
mete out.
Occupational disqualification also involves a definitional problem. If a
court convicts the chief executive officer of an automobile manufacturing
corporation of a criminal offense, a question may arise as to whether occupa-
tional disqualification precludes his acting as the CEO of any corporation or
just of an automobile manufacturing corporation. Title changes easily cir-
cumvent the former, while the demand for a top CEO in any industry makes
the latter ineffective. A penalty structured so as to preclude a corporate
employee from pursing the same duties would also be burdensome and un-
duly vague. An analysis of the cases addressing corporate criminal liability
for homicide highlights the definitional problem inherent in disqualification.
In Lehigh Valley,15 4 for instance, if the court directed disqualification at the
employee who overloaded the boxcar with explosives, a problem arises. The
railroad employed the worker as a freight loader at the time of his allegedly
criminal behavior. The court would have to decide whether occupational
disqualification required that the employee be forbidden from working on
any railroad or that he be forbidden from loading any freight. If the state
charged the employee's supervisor or a corporate officer with an act that the
employee committed, the job definition problems facing the court would be
the same.
One other aspect of corporate criminal liability that proponents often cite
as an effective deterrent is the public enmity and moral stigma attached to
any criminal conviction.1 55 The deterrent effect of this negative publicity,
however, is highly questionable. As previously stated, courts subject corpo-
rate criminals to an entirely different set of standards than they apply to
ordinary criminals. While many Americans view corporate criminals as
151. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 288-89; Comment, Is Corporate
Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 918-19.
152. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
153. See M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 72, at 168. The authors also note that a
study by noted authority Marshall B. Clinard indicated that only 1.5% of all enforcement
efforts in 1975 and 1976 produced conviction of a corporate officer for failure to carry out the
legal duties of the corporation. Id; see also id. at 170-71 (table examining outcome of illegal
campaign contribution investigation of 1973-74).
154. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 318-22 (advocating the use of
publicity as a deterrent); Fisse, supra note 5, at 1146-47 (asserting that other commentators fail
to take notice of deterrent value resulting from the social stigma of conviction); Note, supra
note 3, at 923 (asserting that simple cost analysis will fail when potential public animosity is
added to the equation).
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more worthy of indignation than burglars, 15 6 this view seldom if ever
emerges at trial.' 5 7 Certain sociological factors come into play when a court
tries a corporate criminal. Juries may view the individual as having created
sufficient benefits to overcome the harm that he has caused.' 58 Jurors may
also view corporate executives as persons with whom they can, or wish they
could, identify. Even if the courts convict a corporation of a major crime,
public perception seldom changes. Between 1970 and 1980, 121 Fortune 500
companies were convicted of major crimes or illegal acts resulting in heavy
fines. 159 Most of these corporations rank among the upper echelon of the
Fortune 500, 160 and none has suffered any great loss due to negative public-
ity. 161 For example, despite Ford's acquittal on reckless homicide charges, a
number of decisions have held the company liable for damages in cases in-
volving the Pinto. 162 Even during the trial, however, people continued to
drive and even buy Pintos. Ford remains one of the largest corporations in
America.
The opponents of corporate criminal liability have urged that the fine falls
upon the stockholders, who are twice removed from the wrongdoer. 163
These observers argue that since criminal liability punishes innocent stock-
holders for deeds over which they had no control, civil liability more appro-
priately deters unwanted corporate behavior. 164 The monetary expense of
civil liability, however, is often much higher than the penalties that criminal
law imposes. 16 5 Juries often feel the need to award high punitive damages as
a means of punishing the corporation. 166 The expense of civil penalties falls
156. See M. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME 14-17 (1983). Professor Clinard
notes that public opinion polls showed a drop in confidence in the heads of large corporations
from 55% in 1965 to 15% in 1975. He states that "[tloday, the public regards corporate crime
as a serious offense." Id. at 16. The public regards corporate offenses equal to or more serious
than ordinary crimes, such as burglary or robbery. 1d; see also M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN,
supra note 72, at 173-74 (discussing opinion polls and jury behavior).
157. M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 72, at 174.
158. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 290-91; Comment, Fiction Extended
Too Far?, supra note 5, at 120-21.
159. See M. CLINARD, supra note 156, at 15.
160. Id.
161. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 321. The corporations often react
to negative publicity by launching extensive counterpublicity campaigns. Id.
162. The largest of the civil suits involved a plaintiff who was severely burned when a Pinto
gas tank exploded after a rear-end collision. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). The jury awarded a verdict of $127,841,000, which in-
cluded $125,000,000 in punitive damages. The trial court refused Ford's motion for a new
trial only after the plaintiffs agreed to a $121,500,000 remittitur. 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The
appellate court upheld the reduced verdict. Id. at 391.
163. See Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 920;
Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 42 (1957).
164. See Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, supra note 5, at 920-
28.
165. For example, the jury award in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), was much higher than any monetary criminal penalty. See supra
note 162; see also Frank, Trends in Million-Dollar Verdicts, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 52 (dis-
cussing the increasing frequency of multi-million dollar verdicts); Union Carbide Fights for Its
Life, supra note 5, at 56 (charting the huge price tag in recent liability cases).
166. See supra note 162; Durrill v. Ford Motor Co., No. 79-3203 (Dist. Ct. of Nueces
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just as heavily upon the stockholders as does a criminal fine. In either case
the money paid out will very likely end up being passed on to the public
through higher prices, and therefore, both civil and criminal liability may be
inappropriate as a deterrent.
B. Incapacitation and Rehabilitation
At first sight the concepts of incapacitation and rehabilitation appear to
have little to do with corporate criminal liability. Both concepts can be
considered, however, as subgoals of deterrence and thereby retain a degree of
viability in dealing with corporate criminal liability. 167 Only as subgoals of
deterrence, however, do incapacitation and rehabilitation arguably have any
useful application to corporate criminal law. 168 Incapacitation might also fit
within the concept of retribution, 169 although its greatest benefit to society
may be as a means of deterrence.
Incapacitation is often considered synonymous with incarceration, but
other means of incapacitation can be applied to corporations. The ultimate
form of incapacitation, the death penalty for corporations, is revocation of
the corporate charter. 170 Courts seldom, if ever, have used this extreme mea-
sure. 17 1 Another means of incapacitation courts can impose is corporate
probation. 172 Probation for corporations can take many forms, both mone-
tary and nonmonetary. 173 One problem inherent in using probation, how-
ever, is the lack of a judicial system designed to monitor probation. While a
corporation may be assigned to report to a probation officer, the multi-
layered structure of many corporations may make ascertainment of viola-
tions of some probation conditions impossible. Donative requirements are
easily monitored, but probation conditions requiring internal restructuring
and policy changes may immerse probation officers in a time-consuming
County, 28th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Nov. 22, 1983), discussed in Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at
6, Sept. 4, 1984, at 10 (jury awarded $100 million in punitive damages).
167. See Fisse, supra note 5, at 1159.
168. Id.
169. See infra notes 177-89 and accompanying text.
170. Texas law provides a good example. The Texas Legislature has provided for involun-
tary dissolution or revocation of the corporate charter on suit of the attorney general following
conviction for a felony. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.01 (Vernon 1980) (involuntary
dissolution); id. art. 8.16 (revocation of corporate charter),
171. For example, no Texas court has used involuntary dissolution or revocation of the
corporate charter in a criminal setting.
172. See, e.g., United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1982)
(court required corporate defendant to contribute funds and labor to charitable organizations
as one of the conditions of probation); United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785,
787 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant corporation required to contribute funds and donate an execu-
tive for one year); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 59 (7th Cir. 1972)
(defendant required to develop environmental clean-up programs); United States v. Danilow
Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1164-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bakeries and pastry shops required to
donate baked goods to specified charities); United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F.
Supp. 213, 214 (D. Md. 1983) (corporation required to donate $175,000 to charitable organiza-
tion); see Note, supra note 118, at 638.
173. See Note, supra note 118, at 644-52. When imposing nonmonetary probation, the
court must exercise care in avoiding constitutional traps. Id. at 649-51.
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watchdog role that they are ill-equipped to handle. Incapacitation is, there-
fore, problematic as a legitimate goal of corporate criminal liability.
The modern corporation is a fictional entity created strictly for business
and economic purposes. A corporation does not have a soul or a mind and
thus appears beyond rehabilitation. The internal structure of a corporation,
however, may need rehabilitation. 174 When a court threatens a corporation
with corporate criminal liability, the threat should spark internal corporate
actions designed to prevent the recurrence of any illegal activity, such as
crime prevention policies, internal disciplinary controls, and crime-preven-
tive standard operating procedures. 175 If indeed corporate criminal liability
has these effects, then rehabilitation is occurring. The enactment of internal
controls assumes that deterrent measures levied against the corporation ef-
fectively create a desire to avoid future illegalities. The efficacy of deterrent
measures levied by the court, however, is at least questionable. 176
C. Retribution
The concept of retribution as a goal of criminal law has fallen into disre-
pute in recent years. 177 Many observers feel that the only legitimate goal of
corporate criminal liability is deterrence.178 This assertion, however, com-
pletely ignores the concept of "justice as fairness."' 179 The entire American
legal system is based upon the concept that if one disobeys the law, one will
be punished. If the law fails to punish those who disobey, criminals gain an
advantage by their illegal behavior.' 80  In the absence of retribution, those
who obey the law will soon join those who disobey. The concept of deter-
rence, at least under the present system, is at best questionable. Society can-
not, however, simply allow corporate illegality to continue due to the lack of
any effective deterrent. Such a situation would have a very negative socio-
logical impact.' 8 ' Legal theorists must stop ignoring the real value of retri-
174. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 60, at 305-10; Fisse, supra note 5, at 1159-
66.
175. See Fisse, supra note 5, at 1159-66.
176. See supra notes 112-66 and accompanying text.
177. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 15, § 5; Comment, Fiction Extended Too
Far?, supra note 5, at 118; Note, supra note 3, at 922.
178. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
179. See J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW (1979), cited in Fisse, supra note 5, at 1169. Murphy describes the political
principle of justice as fairness as follows:
In order to enjoy the benefits that a legal system makes possible, each man must
be prepared to make an important sacrifice-namely, the sacrifice of obeying the
law even when he does not desire to do so. Each man calls on others to do this,
and it is only just or fair that he bear a comparable burden when his turn comes.
Now if the system is to remain just, it is important to guarantee that those who
disobey will not thereby gain an unfair advantage over those who obey volunta-
rily. Criminal punishment thus attempts to maintain the proper balance be-
tween benefit and obedience by insuring that there is no profit in criminal
wrongdoing.
J. MURPHY, supra, at 77.
180. J. MURPHY, supra note 179, at 78.
181. See id. at 77-78. If the public perceives that others are committing illegal acts unfet-
tered by criminal liability and thereby gaining an advantage, the public will have no incentive
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bution, which is its balancing influence in our system.
A modern example underscores the importance of retribution. In the past
few years a number of revelations have been made concerning the asbestos
industry in America. Evidence indicates that as early as the 1930s asbestos
manufacturers were aware of the health danger of inhaling asbestos fibers. 182
Despite this knowledge, and often against the advice of their own medical
experts, the manufacturers continued to expose their employees to high
levels of asbestos dust.' 83 One firm went so far as to maintain a policy requir-
ing its doctors not to warn employees of early signs of asbestosis,' 84 despite
the industry's acknowledgment that the disease is progressive and fatal if not
treated in its early stages.' 85 In 1972 the government forced the asbestos
industry to reduce asbestos dust levels in its plants.' 86 The actions of the
industry, however, had already led to a large number of deaths and perma-
nent disabilities.18 7
If deterrence is the only goal of corporate criminal liability, then the as-
bestos industry will face no criminal liability. The officers who made the
decisions that led to the cover-up and the continuance of the dangerous con-
ditions have retired or died.' 88 Current officers carefully comply with fed-
eral regulations to avoid a repetition of earlier conditions. The courts would
deter nothing if they criminally prosecute the corporations. The fact re-
mains, however, that the asbestos corporations knowingly caused the deaths
of their workers. If the legal system allows them to escape without punish-
ment, public confidence in the system will diminish. If, however, the corpo-
rations are charged criminally for the actions of those in earlier years,
theoretically fairness will prevail. This result is especially true in light of the
bankruptcy route that at least one asbestos manufacturer has opted for. 189
While the asbestos industry eliminated the physical danger, a sociological
danger to society still exists if the courts allow asbestos manufacturers to pay
no price for previous wrongdoing. Overcoming that sociological danger is
the goal of retribution.
to remain law-abiding. This result is especially true as the gap between those gaining the
advantage and those not increases.
182. See M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, supra note 72, at 67-69.
183. Id. at 64-69.
184. Asbestosis is a lung disease caused by repeated inhalation of asbestos fibers. Asbestos
is indestructible, and the body, therefore, reacts to its presence by isolating it. Scar tissue
forms, forcing the heart to work harder due to reduced breathing capacity. As the disease
progresses the lungs fill with scar tissue, ultimately causing death. Medical science has not yet
developed a treatment for the disease. Id. at 61. Workers who inhaled excessive amounts of
asbestos dust also suffer from lung cancer and mesothelioma, a rare cancer. Id. at 61-62.
185. Id. at 69. Former Johns-Manville officials confirmed the policy's existence, as did
company records. Id.
186. Id. at 65.
187. See id. at 63-66.
188. See id. at 71-72.
189. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The company
had over 16,000 lawsuits pending against it as of the date of filing the bankruptcy petition. Id.
In denying a motion to liquidate filed by creditors, the court noted the number of unfiled suits




In recent years society's demand for increased corporate accountability
has led to an increase in corporate criminal liability. As courts hold corpo-
rations liable for more serious crimes, however, a dilemma arises. The mod-
ern corporation is often a highly complex, multi-layered economic entity. In
many ways the criminal law simply does not know how to deal with this
huge fictional entity. The growth of criminal law theories has not kept pace
with the growth of corporations. Early decisions in which courts held cor-
porations liable for criminal acts dealt with much smaller corporations that
the criminal law could easily manage. While commentators have posited
numerous theories for controlling modern illegal corporate behavior, the
theories all require society to take some action that it appears unwilling to
take. Public opinion polls reveal great enmity to corporate giants run
amuck, yet juries shrink from punishing corporations or their executives.
An analysis of the goals of criminal law as applied to corporate crime also
reveals numerous problems. Some observers have argued that deterrence is
the only legitimate goal of corporate criminal liability. The deterrent effect
of current sanctions is questionable, however. Other observers have argued
that deterrence cannot be divorced from incapacitation and rehabilitation
because they are all inextricably interwoven. These observers assert that ret-
ribution is a legitimate goal of corporate liability, even in those cases in
which retribution is the only goal. Such cases include those in which a
homicide is caused in the past and the cause is corrected before the state
brings criminal charges. The means of attaining that retribution, however,
remains an open question.
In the final analysis, the answer may lie in the hope that corporations will
police themselves. To control corporations by enforcement measures is vir-
tually impossible because of the strange mixture of fiction and reality inher-
ent in the corporate form. Corporations must realize that, as a long-term
proposition, what is good for society is also good for the corporation. They
must put aside the purely economic basis on which they make many of their
decisions and give something back to the society that permits their existence.
Failure to do so may lead to more dire consequences as society searches for a
means to control corporate illegality.
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